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Abstract
This paper surveys the issue of concrete thinking after brain injury—a phenom-
enon that is widely recognised clinically, but under-investigated in formal
research settings. Through the lens of the classical work of Kurt Goldstein the
paper outlines the diverse clinical manifestations of concreteness, and the barri-
ers which this might present to the psychotherapeutic process. However, the
paper also outlines the way in which preserved psychological functions in highly
concrete patients, specially the capacity to focus on immediate reality, and expe-
rience emotions in present time, can be used as a lever for psychotherapeutic
interventions. The paper concludes with a range of practical suggestions which
may aid the psychotherapist in reaching out to this challenging patient group.
Key words: concrete thinking, abstraction, brain injury, psychotherapy, Kurt
Goldstein.
Closer examination shows that in order to readjust itself to the world, the
injured organism has withdrawn from more or less numerous points of contact
with it and has thus attained a re-adaptation to a shrunken environment.
Goldstein (1936a)
Introduction
Concreteness, sometimes used synonymously with the term impaired
abstraction, is a common phenomenon after brain injury. It is quite usual
to hear, among rehabilitation professionals, phrases such as “this inter-
vention is unlikely to work, because this patient is too concrete”, or “he
cannot completely understand what he is going through, because of his
concreteness”. If we listen to the way professionals use this term, when
speaking about patients, one might suggest that: (a) therapists are able 
to perceive something characteristic in the mode these patients function
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(an observable fact), which they later label as concreteness; (b) this mode
of functioning is experienced as a challenge to the use of therapeutic
tools, and the achievement of rehabilitation goals, including eventual
generalisation and habituation of therapeutic gains. However, when pro-
fessionals are explicitly asked about how they understand concreteness,
and how they address it technically, their responses are usually impre-
cise, with a vague use of terminology, and with a rather poor grasp of
how concreteness maps into specific impaired functions, or particular
sites of brain lesions. The purpose of this article is to address this con-
ceptual gap, by offering a theoretical account of concreteness, and draw-
ing preliminary guidelines on how psychotherapeutic tools could be
adapted to facilitate emotional adjustment in this population.
What is concreteness?
Concreteness, or the difficulty to orient our actions by a conceptual point
of view (Goldstein, 1942; Goldstein & Scherer, 1941), is not a popular
concept today in neuropsychology. This is evident if we consider the
remarkably modest amount of research that has been published in the last
few decades addressing concreteness after brain injury (see Figure 1). The
principal reason may well be that, compared to other neuropsychologi-
cal processes broadly related to frontal lobe function, such as working
memory, planning, or set-shifting, concreteness seems vague and lacking
neuroanatomical specificity. Based on clinical observations, different
authors have suggested that concreteness is not an homogeneous deficit
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Figure 1: Number of publications on concreteness and brain injury. An all-time literature
search in PubMed was performed using the following keywords: concreteness, concrete
attitude, concrete thinking, and brain injury. From a total of 1481 relevant articles, only
twelve were related to brain injury.
(Goldstein & Scherer, 1941, Prigatano, 1989) and that it is frequently 
associated with diffuse lesions (Judd, 1999), or with widespread damage
to the frontal lobes (Judd, 1999; Klonoff, 2010; Ogden, 1996), particularly
on the left (Goldstein, 1942). Given that concreteness (or impaired
abstraction) has long been associated with diffuse lesions to the frontal
lobes (Yang, Fuller, Khodaparast, & Krawczyk, 2010), and with a grow-
ing interest of actual neuropsychology in fractionating frontal lobe 
functions (Miyake et al., 2000; Stuss, 2011; Stuss & Alexander, 2000,
2007), is no surprise that concreteness has potentially become a rather
archaic concept. Interestingly, a different historical trajectory has
occurred in the more applied field of neuropsychological rehabilitation,
where concreteness as a concept which can inform practice, has sur-
vived among clinicians that work with people who experience a brain
injury. This paper will focus, and develop, the clinical value of concrete-
ness.
Authors in neuropsychological rehabilitation have used the concept of
concreteness in different forms. For example, Cicerone and Giacino
(1992) refer to the phenomenon as a failure to appreciate the abstract or
symbolic qualities of ideas, comments, or things. Ponsford, Sloan, and
Snow (1995) have suggested that concrete patients struggle to generalise
from one event, or in distilling the essence of a situation, which impairs
their capacity to learn from experience. Another frequently reported fea-
ture of concreteness is difficulty in thinking beyond present thoughts, or
seeing beyond one’s own perspective (Judd, 1999), which may even
translate into difficulties with empathy (Eslinger, 1998), or self-centered-
ness (Judd, 1999; Obonsawin et al., 2007).
It is interesting to note that most of the above mentioned definitions
are in close alignment with the early work of Kurt Goldstein, who coined
the term “concrete attitude”. He described it as a “realistic attitude,
where behaviour is confined to the immediate [not reflective] apprehen-
sion of a given thing or situation” (Goldstein, 1936b; 1942; Goldstein &
Scherer, 1941). When addressing concreteness, most authors refer more
or less directly to this feature; a basic difficulty in the organism’s ability to
detach itself from the immediate environment, in order to generate a flex-
ible response. Clinically speaking this is usually portrayed as a difficulty
using abstract thought or discursive reasoning to guide behaviour. As a
consequence, behaviour may become perseverative or extremely sus-
ceptible to the varying stimuli in the environment (Goldstein & Scherer,
1941, p. 3).
However, an important trend in recent accounts is the tendency to
reduce concreteness to a cognitive impairment, equivalent to other 
neuropsychological deficits caused by brain injury (e.g., aphasia, impul-
sivity, inattention). This interpretation may be misleading, and certainly
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does not reflect Goldstein’s original idea. He explicitly specified that
concreteness was not equivalent to a cognitive deficit, but rather
reflected an attitude of the total personality:
The abstract and the concrete attitudes are not acquired mental sets or habits
of an individual, or special isolable aptitudes, such as memory, attention, etc.
They are rather capacity levels of the total personality. Each furnishes the basis
for all performances pertaining to a specific plane of activity. In other words,
each attitude constitutes one definite behavioural range (my italics) which
involves a number of performances and responses. These latter, when taken
individually at their surface value, may appear to be discrete entities of quite a
diversified nature (e.g., attention, recall, retention, recognition, synthesizing,
symbolization, etc.) (Goldstein & Scherer, 1941, p. 1)
What seems to be essential in Goldstein’s definition, and absent in recent
accounts, is that concreteness refers to a radical change in the way that
the whole personality, or the Self, constructs internal and external expe-
rience. When elaborating this point, Goldstein explains that, by attitude,
he implies a form of readiness for response. In assuming an abstract or
concrete attitude, he claims, the individual as a whole gears himself
toward a specific direction of activity, a mode of functioning (1941, p. 2).
This emphasis on the Self, which we believe is crucial for holistic reha-
bilitation, is difficult to grasp when concreteness is considered as a cog-
nitive impairment. The intention of this article is to move away from such
neuropsychological reductionism, adopting a self-psychology perspec-
tive to brain injury (Klonoff, Lage, & Chiapello, 1993; Prigatano, 1999a;
Salas, 2012; Salas & Turnbull, 2010).
In this regard it is interesting to note the similarities between
Goldstein’s proposition and more recent theoretical accounts of how
behaviour may change after frontal lobe damage (see Table 1). Mesulam
(1986; 2002), for instance, has suggested that large frontal lesions may
allow the resurgence of a default mode, a realm of neural function where
inflexible stimulus response linkages (the ‘realistic attitude’ of Goldstein)
remain impervious to modification by context or experience (Mesulam,
2002, pp. 14–15). Here the shared notion of “mode of functioning” is
notable, because it stresses the idea that all the organism’s abilities are
aligned under one single pattern of functioning (a mode in Mesulam and
an attitude in Goldstein).
A final theoretical comment needs to be made regarding concreteness
as a neuropsychological deficit. There is no doubt that frontal lesions
may impair many cognitive capacities that allow an abstract stance (e.g.,
set shifting, working memory, monitoring, etc.), however, this loss of
abstract abilities should not be considered as an equivalent of concrete-
ness itself. In other words, concreteness cannot be reduced to the
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absence of an abstract attitude, to some kind of abstraction “blindness”.
Following Mesulam’s idea of a default mode, concreteness may be better
explained as a re-surgence of a primary mode of functioning, which has
been progressively obscured by the development of abstract capacities
throughout ontogeny, and which is preserved in patients despite exten-
sive frontal lobe damage. This view of concreteness, as preservation, not
as a deficit, has been described previously by Sacks (1986) and has radi-
cal consequences to how we approach concrete patients, and recognise
them as experiencing beings:
Much easier to comprehend, and altogether more natural, is the idea of the
preservation of the concrete in brain damage—not regression to it, but preser-
vation of it, so that the essential personality and identity and humanity, the
being of the hurt creature, is preserved. (Sacks, 1986, p. 165)
We have briefly revised the concept of concreteness, hoping that by clar-
ifying it theoretically, its practical relevance in rehabilitation and psy-
chotherapy would become evident. By moving away from a definition
that reduces concreteness to a specific cognitive deficit, we have
adopted a broader view, highlighting how brain damage modifies the
organism’s relationship with its outer and inner worlds. This distinction is
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Realistic Attitude (unreflective and
confined to the immediate apprehension
of an object, idea or situation).
Thinking and acting are directed by the
immediate claims made by one particular
aspect of the object, or the outer world
situation.
Rigidity and lack of shifting (but also
abnormal fluidity).
Impairment in the manipulation and
operation over ideas and thoughts.
Cannot assume an attitude towards the
“mere possible” and to think or perform
symbolically.
Horizon of consciousness confined to
here and now and set reflexively in a
stimulus-bound mode.
Automatic reactions to salient events and
immediate gratifications are guided by
prevailing motivational states.
Presence of repetitive responses although
they may not fit with environmental
demands.
Options for alternative interpretations are
not encouraged.
Appearance cannot be differentiated
from significance.
Table 1: Comparison between Goldstein’s concrete attitude and Mesulam’s
default mode
Concrete Attitude Default Mode
(Goldstein & Scherer, 1941) (Mesulam, 2002)
indispensable to understand, for example, how functioning in a concrete
mode might transform, but not abolish, subjective experience after the
injury (see Prigatano, 1991).
Why concreteness is relevant to neuropsychological rehabilitation
We believe that the concept of concreteness has survived among reha-
bilitation professionals because of its clinical value. Concreteness is use-
ful because, as a concept, it fits well with three main principles that
guide rehabilitation practice. First, concreteness underlines how brain
injury modifies the experiencing Self, a proposition that is in accordance
with the first principle of rehabilitation: “the clinician must begin with
the patient’s subjective or phenomenological experience, in order to
reduce frustration and confusion as means to engage him in the rehabili-
tation process” (Prigatano, 1999a, p. 3). Goldstein’s model of concrete-
ness offers a detailed description of how phenomenological experience
may change after brain injury, allowing a deeper understanding of these
transformations and, in consequence, helping clinicians to grasp the dis-
organised mind and to attune to the wounded soul.
Second, we know that neuropsychological rehabilitation has progres-
sively evolved from an interest in cognitive deficits, and retraining, with
an increased emphasis on socio-emotional functioning and participation
(Mateer, Sira, & O’Connell, 2005; McGrath, 2004; Wilson, 1997; 2003;
2008; Wilson, Gracey, Evans, & Bateman, 2010). This movement is, for
example, illustrated by the growing literature on identity change (Carroll
& Coetzer, 2011; Cloute, Mitchell, & Yates, 2008; Gracey et al., 2008;
Segal, 2010; Yeates, Gracey, & McGrath, 2008; Ylvisaker & Feeney,
2000) and interpersonal relationships (Bowen et al., 2009; Bowen,
Yeates, & Palmer, 2010; Feigelson, 1993) after brain injury. Concrete-
ness, as we have defined it, taps directly into these issues. It usually
implies some kind of shrinkage of the temporal and representational
domains of the Self, which radically transforms the way in which the Self
relates to itself (Self as an object) and to others (Self–Other). A deeper
understanding of concreteness may, therefore, guide the assessment and
design of rehabilitation interventions addressing these emotional and
interpersonal issues.
Third, concreteness, often associated with frontal lobe damage, com-
promises elaborated thinking and the use of organising schemas. As a
consequence, patients may experience difficulties creating new and ade-
quately organised mental models of the self after the injury (Prigatano,
1989; Ylvisaker & Feeney, 2000; Ylvisaker, Mcpherson, Kayes, & Pellet,
2008), compromising a central goal for rehabilitation (Biderman,
Daniels-Zide, Reyes, & Marks, 2006; Klinger, 2005; Nochi, 1998).
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Why concreteness is relevant to psychotherapeutic approaches
to brain injury
The influence of holistic paradigms in neuropsychological rehabilitation
has generated renewed interest in the use of psychotherapeutic tools to
address emotional (Coetzer, 2004; 2007; Dewar & Gracey, 2006; Freed,
2002; Gracey, Oldham, & Kritzinger, 2007; Klonoff, 2010; 2011; Lewis,
1999; Prigatano, 1986; Psaila & Gracey, 2009; Salas, 2008a) and inter-
personal (Bowen, 2007; Bowen, Yeates, & Palmer, 2010; Salas, 2012;
Yeates et al., 2008) difficulties after brain injury. Interestingly, lack of
insight and inflexible thinking, two features usually associated with con-
creteness, have been reported by therapists as common challenges in
their work with people who acquired a brain injury (Judd & Wilson,
2005). Unfortunately, very few authors have addressed how concrete-
ness may impact the use of psychotherapeutic tools, and the necessary
technical modifications that working with these patients entail (Judd,
1999; Klonoff, 2010; Miller, 1993; Prigatano, 1986, 1994; Salas, 2008b;
Ylvisaker & Feeney, 2000).
Concreteness is relevant to psychotherapy for several reasons. First,
and most obvious, because it implies a change in how the subject relates
to his internal world, thus altering the same territory in which psycho-
therapy takes place. Second, the realistic attitude may impact different
dimensions of the therapeutic process (see Coetzer, 2007 for a descrip-
tion of different dimensions in a generic model of psychotherapy for trau-
matic brain injury (TBI)), setting theoretical and technical challenges that
therapists must deal with. For example, concreteness might compromise
patients’ capacity to spontaneously report problems or conflicts to the
therapist (therapeutic operations), reflect about themselves during per-
sonal (self-relatedness) and interpersonal interactions (therapeutic bond),
or link emotions with external events or situations (in-session impacts).
Challenges to psychotherapeutic work with concrete patients
The concrete or realistic attitude, described by Goldstein, can be consid-
ered as contraction in temporal (presentness) and representational (mean-
ing generation) dimensions of the Self (see Figure 2). In this section we
will describe how these transformations may challenge the use of classic
psychotherapeutic tools, requiring theoretical and technical adaptations.
Concrete attitude as presentness
According to Goldstein, the concrete or realistic attitude implies that we
are confined to the immediate apprehension of a given object or situa-
tion, in its particular uniqueness. Thinking and acting are thus directed
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by the immediate claims which one particular aspect of the object or of
the outer world situation makes (Goldstein, 1942, pp. 89–90; Goldstein
& Scherer, 1941, pp. 2–3). At a behavioural level, this feature of con-
creteness can be observed as a difficulty of voluntarily shifting from the
experience of a present stimulus, or also as a passive drifting from one
stimulus to another (exaggerated attentiveness). In both cases the object,
or situation, acquires an abnormal preponderance, and the individual is
thus forced by the stimulus (Goldstein, 1936a,b). In practice, patients
may come across as “inflexible” or “rigid”.
The degree to which an individual can be forced by the stimulus may
vary. At the most extreme end of the continuum, patients may exhibit
utilisation behaviours (Lhermitte, 1983, 1986; Lhermitte, Pillon, &
Serdaru, 1986), where the visuo-tactile presentation of an object elicits
its use or grasping, even though no instructions are given to do so
(Shallice, Burgess, Schon, & Baxter, 1989). Such patients open doors that
are in front of them, get dressed after seeing a shirt in the closet, or lie
down if their attention is taken by the bed. In milder cases, individuals
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Figure 2: Changes generated by concreteness in temporal and reflective dimensions of
the Self. The figure represents how concreteness contracts the Self (doted circle line)
along these two dimensions. Temporal changes modify the Self’s capacity to move for-
wards and backwards in time (time travel), while Reflective changes modify the self’s
capacity to detach from immediate experience, a basic requirement for self-observation
and self/other-observation. Visceral experience (Bodily Self), or core experience, is
largely preserved despite representational deficits (Extended Self).
may preserve the capacity to inhibit motoric outputs in relation to
objects, but their cognition can be “captured” by immediate object/situ-
ation claims, as in difficulties sustaining a cognitive set, or shifting to
another (Shallice, Stuss, Picton, Alexander, & Gillingham, 2008a,b). For
example, when instructed to say words that begin with the letter “s”, with
the exception of names, a concrete patient may say: “the only things I
can think of now are names”.
Even though Goldstein primarily described concreteness in behavioural
terms, he also acknowledged its relevance for subjective experience (see
the chapter on values in his Lanuti case; Hanfmann, Rickers-Ovsiankina,
& Goldstein, 1944). Thus, if a person is constantly forced by stimuli,
his/her capacity to detach from immediate experience is compromised,
becoming somehow stuck in the experiencing moment. We would like to
expand Goldstein’s conceptualisation by suggesting that concreteness can
change the temporal dimension of the Self; usually understood as a capac-
ity to move backwards into past experiences (hindsight), or forward into
possible future scenarios (foresight), an ability typically described in the
literature as “time travelling” (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 2007).
Presentness and therapeutic operations
According to Orlinsky’s (2009) model of generic psychotherapy (see
Table 2), one dimension of the psychotherapeutic process relates to the
so called therapeutic operations, where patients present information or
complaints to the therapist, usually related to problematic feelings,
symptoms, or life situations. This is the first step of any psychotherapeu-
tic exchange cycle, where patients bring into the session difficulties that
they have experienced outside the consulting room.
Concrete patients may struggle presenting “material” to the therapist
because the emotional noise of a conflictive event may rapidly fade once
new events force the organism’s attention in another direction. As a
result, patients may appear indifferent (or even happy!), with no visible
trace of any distress that might become material to initiate a therapeutic
cycle. In many cases this untroubled stance may differ from the thera-
pist’s internal experience of something conflictive that is left outside, or
the relative’s distress when describing family issues. The therapist might
be tempted then to point out events or situations that deserve to be
attended to by the patient, usually with no success. At best, the patient
may rationally acknowledge the existence of such events or problems,
but without emotional congruence or signs of conflict. In more severe
cases, the patient may experience the situation interpreted by the thera-
pist as something completely alien. Consider the case of Mrs I, a patient
seen by one of the authors (FV).
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Mrs I is a fifty-four-year-old woman who sustained a severe traumatic
brain injury in a road traffic accident. She also has a large right frontal
infarction, caused by carotid dissection during the same accident. She
has a dense left hemiplegia and a wide range of cognitive (mainly
executive), emotional and behavioural impairments.
In most sessions, Mrs I experiences low mood, and expresses a great
deal of anger and frustration about her circumstances and the difficul-
ties she experiences. These usually relate to the control of her finances,
the ongoing adaptation of her home, and arrangements for her care
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Table 2: Different dimensions of a psychotherapeutic process according to the
Model of Generic Psychotherapy (Orlinsky, 2009)
Psychotherapy Definition
Dimensions
Therapeutic Mutual understanding between therapist and patient 
contract regarding goals of the collaboration, methods to be used, 
modality (e.g., individual, couple therapy, etc.) and norms 
governing participants’ behaviour in their role as therapist 
or patient.
Therapeutic Technical or instrumental aspect of the process. Four cyclic 
operations steps can be described:
1) Presentation of complaints and information about 
problematic feelings, symptoms, or life situations.
2) Construction by the therapist of an “expert” understand-
ing of the real problem underlying patient’s complaints.
3) Offering a therapeutic intervention by the therapist.
4) The intervention evokes co-operation dynamics 
(collaboration or resistance) that offers further 
information for a new cycle to start.
Therapeutic Interpersonal aspect of the therapy process. It encompasses 
bond task-teamwork and empathic resonance.
Self-relatedness Intrapersonal aspect of the process, defined as the way in 
which a person perceives and responds to him while 
interacting with those around him.
In-session It refers to positive (insight, emotional relief, and sense 
impacts of hope) and negative (confusion, anxiety, and discourage-
ment) results attained during sessions.
Temporal Different configurations that the five previously mentioned 
patterns dimensions acquire as the therapy process change over time 
as micro-events within therapy sessions and macro-events 
over the course of treatment.
and support. She has a strong tendency to blame others for difficulties
that arise and she has little insight into her impairments and their con-
sequences. In a few other sessions, Mrs I appears to be entirely content
and happy. During these sessions and at moment of positive affect, it is
impossible to engage her in a discussion about her brain injury, or any
of the difficulties she commonly complains about. On these occasions,
Mrs I no longer feels that she has a brain injury. She reports that she is
content because she will soon be able to move into her new home.
Mrs I is convinced that the move into the new accommodation will be
problem-free and that life in the new house will be perfect.
The case of Mrs I illustrates how concreteness can compromise the
capacity to use events from the past as psychotherapeutic material in the
present. In her situation, past negative events (e.g., difficulties in the
house conversion or managing finances), that usually are a source of dis-
tress, appear to not exist when she is captured (in the present) by circum-
stances that elicit positive emotions. In other words, during these
moments of positive emotion it seems as if she exists entirely within her
contentment and could not relate to any other emotional experience. She
attributes her previous frustration and anger to relatively minor factors
(e.g., the builders weren’t making good progress) and her current happi-
ness to its reversal. When asked about some of the important factors that
usually underpin her sense of catastrophe, she dismisses them as no
longer important because the house will be finished soon. She refuses to
accept that the difficulties that accompany any move into recently built
accommodation will occur, and will inevitably be disappointed and
enraged when they do.
It is interesting to note that Mrs I’s difficulties do not exclusively
involve returning to a past scenario to generate conflict, but also consider
possible future events as potential sources of distress. This observation is
in agreement with the idea that psychotherapy does not exclusively work
through the elaboration of material from past events, but also deals with
the emotional impact of “possible” scenarios (this is striking in the treat-
ment of anxiety disorders, for example). This evaluation of “future conse-
quences” relies on the Self’s capacity to project into the future, detaching
from present moment and its current emotional valence. Concrete
patients, being forced by present stimulus or situations, can show diffi-
culties in the use of future scenarios to activate a manifest conflict.
A similar observation has been made by Freed (2002) when describing
that patients with traumatic brain injuries have difficulties using bodily
signals of negative value (signal anxiety in psychoanalytic language) to
anticipate, and prepare, for negative future events. Evidence from the
study of frontal lobe and the envisioning of emotional events in the future
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(D’Argembau, Xue, Lu, Van der Linden, & Bechara, 2008), and data 
from prospective memory deficits after traumatic brain injury (Potvin,
Rouleau, Audy, Charbonneau, & Giguère, 2011; Shum, Fleming, &
Neulinger, 2002; Shum, Valentine, & Cutmore, 1999) and frontal lobe
lesions (Umeda, Kurosaki, Terasawa, Kato, & Miyahara, 2011; Volle,
Gonen-Yaacovi, de Lacy Costello, Gilbert, & Burguess, 2011), appears to
offer additional support to this hypothesis.
Concreteness, representational meaning and abstraction
Changes in the reflexive dimension of the Self are of great relevance for
emotional adjustment and potential to utilise and gain from psychother-
apy. This dimension refers to a capacity to detach from direct experi-
ence, by verbally reflecting upon our own (or other’s) behaviour. We
specifically relate this dimension to the generation of representational
meaning, because it involves the manipulation of ideas and thoughts
about experience. Here it is interesting to note that Goldstein himself
emphasised that the process of disintegration towards the concrete does
not reduce the arousal of ideas and thoughts as such, but affects, and
modifies the way of manipulating and operating with ideas and thoughts
(Goldstein & Scherer, 1941). This distinction is extremely important
because highlights that concreteness does not compromise primary or
core experience, but instead the way we built reflective meaning upon
these elements. Consider the case of Mr A to illustrate these matters:
Mr A is a young man in his thirties that suffered a severe traumatic
brain injury in a car accident. After two years of successful rehabilita-
tion he was finally working in his former position, as executive of an
important bank. Even though he still experienced some cognitive diffi-
culties related to effort tolerance and multitasking, he was able to per-
form his job without major problems. One day Mr A’s wife called his
psychotherapist (CS) in a state of crisis. She told him that, for several
days, Mr A had been acting strangely. He was restless, and com-
plained of headaches. He also kept saying that he did not want to go to
the office. Mr A’s wife found this quite unusual, because headaches
were frequent, and Mr A never stopped working because of this com-
plaint. She commented to the therapist that she tried to talk to him, to
find out if there was something bothering him, in order to understand
his avoidance of work, but without success. However, she mentioned
to the therapist that perhaps Mr A was behaving this way because of
the arrival of someone new to the office, who had been placed in a
very similar position to Mr A. This made sense to the therapist, and he
remembered that Mr A had talked about this new staff member weeks
previously. However, Mr A did not looked explicitly conflicted by this
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event at that moment. Indeed, he made jokes and appeared to look
patronisingly towards the new employee. During the next session the
therapist tried to explore Mr A’s understanding of this crisis and his
need to avoid work. Mr A was not able to link the events with any
external circumstance or emotional state. He simply stated that he felt
ill, and that this did not mean anything beyond that. It took several ses-
sions to progressively link these bodily feelings to the changes that
have taken place at work. It took even longer to begin exploring more
complex emotions associated with the threatening presence of the
new staff member. Mr A realised the new employee was smart, and
perhaps more skilful than him after the accident. He expressed irrita-
tion about how this new arrival was trying to win over his boss. He
also referred feelings of anger at his accident and himself for making
things hard at work, thus limiting his chances for a promotion.
Mr A’s case is interesting for several reasons. It illustrates a common dif-
ficulty of concrete patients to “make sense” out of conflicting situations,
by reflecting upon their experience as a coping mechanism (e.g., I feel
threatened by this new employee who is smarter than me). It has been
described that, in such situations, concrete patients tend to avoid the
source of conflict (Krpan, Levine, Stuss, & Dawson, 2007; Krpan, Stuss, &
Anderson, 2011), as a way of down-regulating the emotional disorgani-
sation it produces (Riley, Brennan, & Powell, 2004). The case of Mr A is
also an example on how concrete patients preserve a capacity to guide
behaviour based on somatic sensations (e.g., headaches, restlessness),
which mobilise the organism in a rather basic approach or withdrawal
fashion.
Difficulty reflecting on experience appears to be closely related to
abstraction deficits1. Several studies have reported that patients with brain
injury, and especially those involving the frontal lobes, such as traumatic
brain injury, may present with impairments in the ability to structure and
synthesise abstract concepts (Elmore & Gorham, 1957; Hagen, 1984;
Yang, Fuller, Khodaparast, & Krawczyk, 2010) as in proverbs, irony, and
metaphor (Groher, 1983; Hagen, 1984; Levin, Benton, & Grossman,
1982; Towne & Entwisle, 1993). This type of impairment would compro-
mise the patient’s capacity to look beyond the most salient elements of
experience, in order to generate a broader understanding of situations that
encompass multiple perspectives (see Table 3).
Abstraction capacities appear to have a central role in a psychothera-
peutic process. It has been proposed that abstraction is a key component
in the generation of new mental structures during psychotherapy
(Schneider, 1983, in Mergenthaler, 1996). In addition, the temporal
coincidence of abstraction and emotion has been suggested as being
related to therapeutic change (Mergenthaler, 1996).
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A paradigmatic impairment of abstraction in TBI patients is the difficulty
to comprehend metaphor or, in simple words, that the map is not always
the territory (which is a metaphor in itself that we are using to synthesise
an idea). By using metaphors we compact meaning (Ylvisaker & Feeney,
2000) and transfer information regarding internal states more effectively
to others (e.g., I felt like hiding my head in the sand). As the reader can
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Table 3: Comparison of a concrete patient and a matched healthy control on
the Similarities task (Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III)
Stimuli Concrete patient Subject with no 
(left prefrontal stroke) brain injury
Fork/Spoon You . . . (gestures bringing something Cutlery
into the mouth) put it in your mouth
Socks/Shoes For your feet . . . warmth Clothing
Yellow/Green Colours Colours
Dog/Lion Bark? Animals
Coat/Suit Here . . . here puts the suit Clothing
(puts her hands on her chest) . . . 
warmth (keeps doing the gesture on 
her chest) to fasten . . . wool
Orange/Banana Fruit Fruits
Eye/Ear On your face . . . one is for sight Senses
and the other one for hearing
Boat/Car Transport Transport
Table/Chair For . . . good for eating Furniture
Work/Play They are both good for you . . . Activities people do
you work and you play
Steam/Fog Same really. Steam is by man and Made of water, 
fog is here (points to the sky) . . . misty
rain. Steam . . . you press a button 
and comes out
Egg/Seed They are both the same really . . . Beginning of life
more generation
Democracy/ One has a king and the other one Ways of ruling
Monarchy does not
Poem/Statue Statue you see it and the poem is Forms of art
for you to say
imagine, metaphor has an important role in psychotherapy and hence,
metaphoric comprehension deficits can obstruct the use of metaphor to:
(a) access to personal memories and feelings (Frank & Frank, 1993); (b)
facilitate the entry for the therapeutic dyad into the patient’s inner world
(Angus, Levitt, & Hardtke, 1999); and (c) construct narratives that gener-
ate meaning (Sarbin, 1986; Schafer, 1992).
Concreteness, insight, and emotional awareness 
Another aspect of the psychotherapeutic process that can be challenged
by concreteness is the capacity to generate insight (Judd, 1999). Insight
refers to an awareness and understanding of one’s own behavioural pat-
terns and motivations (Luborsky, Crits-Cristoph, Mintz, & Auerbach,
1988), and has been considered as a type of “therapeutic realisation” that
occurs during sessions and leads to change (Orlinsky, 2009). Insight is a
necessary capacity in the emotional adjustment of patients with trau-
matic brain injury (Coetzer, 2007), especially when addressing questions
about normality or the meaning of life after brain damage (Prigatano,
1986; 1991; 1999a). The case of Mr A can illustrate this point in terms of
the difficulties he experienced in understanding how his somatic states
(headache and restlessness) were connected to environmental triggers
(arrival of the new staff member). To him, nothing else existed besides
the immediate distress that forced him to act. His capacity to detach from
direct experience, and to reflect upon his behaviour, was somehow shat-
tered—especially when in more challenging states of arousal. Here, it
was not an external stimulus that forced Mr A to function in certain direc-
tion, but an internal and urgent state of catastrophe (see Salas, 2012).
The case of Mrs I illustrates a slightly different quality of concreteness,
which is the influence of emotion on cognitive ability and awareness.
Although Mrs I usually has little awareness of her neurobehavioural
impairments, she can occasionally become more accepting of the idea
that her emotions, behaviour, and cognitive abilities have been altered
and impaired by the TBI. However, these moments of insight are both
transient and critically dependent upon Mrs I having a strong sense of
being heard and validated within the current session. In these are
moments, when Mrs I is calmer and soothed, she seems more able to
detach herself from direct experience, and adopt a slightly more reflec-
tive, and less defensive, position in relation to her difficulties. She can,
for example, give clear descriptions of some profound changes, such as
being unable to inhibit over-familiar responses with strangers. For further
discussion on this point, see the section on building mental schemes and
manipulating negative arousal.
If insight refers to an awareness and understanding of one’s own 
motivations (Luborsky, Crits-Cristoph, Mintz, & Auerbach, 1988), and is
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closely linked to emotional relief (Orlinsky, 2009), the relationship
between emotional experience and abstraction deficits needs to be fur-
ther understood. Goldstein himself briefly wrote on this topic, suggesting
that patient’s emotional responses (e.g., dulling of emotions or great
excitability) were determined by their capacity to grasp the essentials of a
situation, and not to a primary defect in emotional experience per se
(Goldstein, 1936b). Modern authors have proposed a similar idea regard-
ing patients with frontal lesions, suggesting that disruption of emotion is
highly dependent on context. For example, patients may show dimin-
ished emotional responses to issues that are abstract or not immediately
present, together with exaggerated emotional responses to immediately
present stimuli (Anderson, Barrash, Bechara, & Tranel, 2006). Consider
the example of Mr R, a patient who suffered a large left frontal and pari-
etal stroke, to illustrate how concreteness may narrow emotional life to
the present moment (Goldstein, 1936a). As part of an experiment Mr R
had to watch short film clips, which were intended to elicit sadness. After
each of the clips he had to report how he felt during the films by rating
emotional words (e.g., how shaky did you feel while watching the clip?).
When asked “how lonely did you feel?” he replied, perplexed: “why
should I feel lonely if I’m here in this room with you?”
Mr R’s behaviour and verbal report is interesting. If we consider his
facial behaviour during the clip, it is clear that he was able to experience
sadness. However, when he was asked to offer some insight about the
recently passed emotional experience he struggled to grasp the essence
of the question. Although this type of question seems quite straightfor-
ward, answering it would require him to: (a) detach from the present
moment and move backwards in time (while watching the clip); (b) acti-
vate an “as if” emotional experience of a non-present situation (how did
I feel then?); and (c) infer abstract information related to the emotional
experience (how much?). Mr R’s answer reflected difficulties performing
these operations, and was instead forced by the salient elements of the
present situation (he was, in fact, not alone in the room, at that moment)
and the emotional states associated with it (he did not currently feel
lonely).
A further understanding of how concreteness compromises emotional
awareness, and a key capacity for psychotherapy, can be obtained from
research on alexithymia and TBI. Alexithymia, a clinical concept that has
been widely related to mental health, has striking similarities with tem-
poral and reflective changes involved by concreteness. For example,
alexithymia has been defined as comprising a: (a) difficulty identifying
and describing emotions; (b) a concrete communication style; (c) an
externally oriented style of thinking; and (d) limited imaginal capacity
(Taylor, Bagby, & Parker, 1997). In addition, it has also been suggested
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that alexithymia is linked to a failure to elevate emotions from pre-con-
ceptual to conceptual levels of mental organisation (Taylor, Bagby, &
Parker, 1997), a core feature of concrete thinking.
In TBI, there are reports that suggest a high level of incidence of alex-
ithymia (Becerra, Amos, & Jongenelis, 2002; Henry, Phillips, Crawford,
Theodorou, & Summers, 2006; Wood & Williams, 2007; 2010), which
does not appear to be explained by low level emotion perception deficits
(McDonald et al., 2011). TBI patients who exhibit alexithymic traits tend
to present more physical symptoms (Wood, Williams, & Kalyani, 2009),
that appear to function as ways of dealing with emotional distress
(Williams et al., 2001). This piece of evidence seems to support the idea
that concreteness is characterised by a representational (but not somatic)
difficulty generating meaning (as portrayed in Mr A’s case). Unfortu-
nately, to our knowledge, no research programme has explored the link
between concreteness (as described by Goldstein) and alexithymia.
Concreteness and the therapeutic bond
Changes in the reflective and temporal dimensions of the Self not only
influence the use of therapeutic tools (e.g., insight), but also the inter-
personal space where psychotherapy unfolds, often known as the thera-
peutic bond (Orlinsky, 2009). Evidence associating the quality of the
therapeutic bond with therapy outcome (Martin, Garske, & Davis, 2000;
Orlinsky, Ronnestad, & Willutzki, 2004) appears to justify the need 
to comprehend how concreteness may compromise such a relevant
dimension.
According to Orlinsky (2009) two aspects of the therapeutic bond can
be distinguished. Task team-work refers to how much patients and thera-
pists are able to invest in their respective roles, and how they can coor-
dinate positions of control and initiative. Personal rapport denotes the
level of empathic resonance that patient and therapist may accomplish,
by attuning to one another. It also refers to the emotional climate gener-
ated by their emotional responses to one another.
As reviewed above, in relation to therapeutic operations, concreteness
can compromise patients’ capacity to present problems or difficulties,
which are the basic material for therapeutic work. This difficulty can
influence the balance of control and initiative inside the dyad, forcing
the therapist into a more pro-active or leading attitude. This particular
team-work configuration is not negative per se, but it can potentially
endanger the patient’s sense of agency, which is based on the experience
of control and proactivity. To consider this is of extreme relevance, espe-
cially in view that a main goal for psychotherapy with brain injured
patients is helping them regaining some sense of agency in their life,
despite the difficulties set by cognitive deficits.
CONCRETENESS AND PSYCHOTHERAPY AFTER BRAIN INJURY 17
In relation to the second aspect of the therapeutic bond, personal rap-
port, several ideas need to be considered. First, it is necessary to clarify
that concreteness does not appear to compromise patients’ capacity to
react emotionally to others or to establish new emotional bonds, which
are basic abilities required to found a therapeutic relationship. Never-
theless, concrete patients may present difficulties functioning in more
abstract or representational levels of interpersonal life2. For example, con-
crete patients might struggle to generate emotionally-driven cognitions
about the therapist (so called phantasies in psychoanalytic language),
which are often a source of conflict, as well as material for the process. In
other words, patients will react emotionally to the therapist according to
past experiences (e.g., feeling negative during the week and deciding not
to call the therapist), but will be less able to produce the associated affec-
tive-mental scripts about his/her relationship with the therapist (e.g., I will
not call him now that I feel troubled; I do not have to bother him. I will
wait until our next session. I should sort this out by myself. Yes! He has
his own life. Why should he care for me? You have to do it by yourself!
Or are you not able to? Before this damn accident you never asked for any
help! Why should it be different now?). The exploration of such mental
scenarios is a key element for psychotherapy, where affective-mental
scripts that guide behaviour, progressively become more conscious, thus
facilitating its voluntary regulation. However, affective-mental scripts that
involve the therapist are especially relevant because they allow an in situ
exploration, capturing the emotional intensity of present experience. The
“archaeological” task of putting together, in the simplest possible way, the
different elements that compose affective-mental scripts is a fundamental
step in the process of identity reconstruction after brain injury (Salas,
2009; Ylvisaker & Feeney, 2000).
Another core aspect of personal rapport is the emotional climate gen-
erated by patient–therapist interaction. Here we would like to put for-
ward two basic ideas in line with previous work on countertransference
and brain injury (Coetzer, 2006; Klonoff, 2010; Lewis, 1999; Pepping,
1993; Salas, 2008a). The first one relates to the therapist’s experience of
the patient’s concrete mind, which may trigger diverse feelings and sen-
sations. For example, patient’s difficulty generating meaning beyond
what is tangible can be felt by the therapist as “impenetrability”, or an
inability to access the subtleties of subjective life. Impairments in idea
generation can be also experienced by the therapist as “inertia”, a sort of
resistance of the mind to move in any direction. These sensations are, at
the same time, obstacles in the therapeutic process and “samples” of the
patient’s inner experience of his own mind. Even though they can trigger
feelings of frustration, they are valuable hints about the nature of the
patient’s concrete world.
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This raises a second observation, that relates to the impact of the con-
crete mind of the patient on the abstract mind of the therapist. This is not
a phenomenon exclusively associated with concreteness, but one that
can be widely observed when working with brain injured patients with
different profiles of cognitive deficits, and that can be referred to as
“organic countertransference”.3 For example, when working with dysex-
ecutive patients, therapists may exhibit problems finding words or organ-
ising thoughts, thus effectively mimicking the patients’ deficits. The basic
idea here is that, in the same way that therapists (or relatives) influence,
and enhance, patient’s cognitive performance (Bowen, Yeates, & Palmer,
2010; Freed, 2002), patients’ neuropsychological deficits can also
impact therapists’ (and relatives) mental functioning. This is a relational
axiom that needs to be kept in mind when addressing the impact of con-
creteness on personal rapport, especially regarding the capacity to attune
to each other. The main point here is that, when working with brain
injured patients we do not just attune emotionally but, perhaps more
importantly, also neuropsychologically.
A specific difficulty involved in attuning to concrete patients is that
therapists try to accomplish such goals using their abstract mind, which
by default adds multiple layers of complexity to the simpler experience
of concrete patients. Where there is pure vivid and intense experience,
the abstract mind steps back, looking for connections, patterns, or regu-
larities. Thus the abstract mind is constantly complicating, diluting, and
unifying experience (Sacks, 1986). This is a challenge, perhaps one of the
most important challenges, for any therapist working with concrete
patients. Its relevance is manifold. No access to the phenomenological
experience of the patient (Prigatano, 1999a) is possible without the ther-
apist becoming concrete. Similarly, no guidance can be offered to rela-
tives without teaching them how to relate to the concrete.
Technical modifications in psychotherapeutic work with
concrete patients
The starting point: preservation of [present] emotional 
experience
After considering the challenges that concreteness sets to psychotherapy,
the reader might wonder: to what purpose, given that these patients seem
poor candidates for psychotherapy? This type of reaction by clinicians,
which is a mixture of discouragement and disbelief on the suitability of
our psychotherapeutic tools, for meaningful and effective work with
brain-injured persons, on many levels makes complete sense. Indeed,
feelings of frustration are quite common among psychotherapists who
work with this population (Judd & Wilson, 2005).
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It is the experience of the authors that the only way out from this posi-
tion of powerlessness is by focusing not exclusively on what is lost, but
also on what is preserved. As mentioned above, in concreteness, “the
personality, identity and humanity, the being of the hurt creature, is pre-
served” (Sacks, 1986, emphasis added). An idea such as this might seem
counterintuitive, considering the massive transformations in psychologi-
cal functioning that abstraction loss entails. However, while abstraction
might be disrupted, the sentient self of concrete patients remains intact.
Although this may be hard to picture, especially after our detailed
description of concreteness as a deficit, the case of Mr J might be of help
to illustrate this point more practically.
Mr J is a thirty-seven-year-old man who sustained a severe TBI after a
traffic accident. As a consequence he experienced deficits in cognitive
domains such as sustained attention and divided attention, prospective
memory, working memory, set shifting, and fluidity. In addition, he also
showed awareness difficulties in terms of “indifference” towards these
cognitive difficulties when they were not concretely evident. A striking
fact about Mr J was that, despite his cognitive deficits, he remained
someone capable of experiencing, and expressing, emotional states dur-
ing interpersonal interactions. Furthermore, his emotional experience
had the same features described by Sacks (1986); it was vivid, intense,
detailed, yet simple. This is observable in the following example, where
Mr J was asked to perform a fluidity task:
Task 1: Write five different sentences with the word “rock”. (1) There is
a seagull over the rock; (2) There is a sea lion sleeping on the rock; (3)
I sit on the rock to watch the sea; (4) The rock is very hard; 5) Sea stars
are stuck onto the rock. Task 2: Write five different sentences with the
word “sky”. (1) The sky is blue; (2) In the sky there are white clouds; (3)
In the sky there are many stars; (4) If you look up into the sky at night
you see only stars; (5) The sky is illuminated by stars.
Mr J’s answers in the tasks present some common features of concrete-
ness. They are highly detailed, and mainly based on sensory information.
It is also possible to observe some tendency to perseverate in the topic or
scene (e.g., a rock in the sea) without shifting to other different uses, or
possible contexts, for the target object. Both elements, the high sensory
level of detail, and the capture by a single situation or scenario, are
examples of what we have described above as “presentness”, or “being
forced” by stimuli. However, it is interesting to note that Mr J’s answers
do not exclusively portray the impact of abstract deficits in thought
processes, but also suggest richness of emotional experience in the 
present. His answers have, arguably, a genuine sense of depth, as if the
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detailed depiction of the scene could transmit the experiencing moment
with unusual vividness. The apparent paradox between abstract loss and
preservation of personality seem here to dissipate. Emotional experience
always occurs in present time, and concreteness is presentness. Even
though the capacity of the self to project into past or future scenarios
adds invaluable layers of complexity to emotional life, emotional experi-
ence always unfolds in present time (feeling sad), even if it is triggered by
memories from the past (I lost some one I love) or phantasies about the
future (I will be left alone).
It is exactly the preservation of these basic emotional capacities that
have led authors to suggest that is not only the disorganised mind that
needs to be addressed in rehabilitation (e.g., cognitive retraining), but
also the wounded “soul” (Prigatano, 1991). Concrete patients, like all
patients with brain injury, need to regain a sense of meaning and identity
in order to cope better with the psychosocial problems they face
(Prigatano, 1986; 1994). This need has been perhaps underestimated by
psychotherapists (Judd & Wilson, 2005), who have tended to assume that
cognitive impairments prevent these patients engaging with, and benefit-
ting from, psychotherapy (Jude, 1999; Jude & Wilson, 2005; Prigatano,
2003). This paper proposes a different point of view. We believe that by
acknowledging, and comprehensively understanding, these impair-
ments, it is possible to adapt the way we do psychotherapy (see
Prigatano, 1986), and to work more effectively as a result. We also
believe that this challenge has an ethical connotation, based on the
recognition that concrete patients clearly experience psychological suf-
fering (Goldstein, 1959, 1995[1965]; Hanfmann, Rickers-Ovsiankina &
Goldstein, 1944; Salas, 2012), and often attempt to understand their 
situation, despite deficits of abstraction (Prigatano, 1986) and, at some
point, they actively seek help in order to gain such understanding (Freed,
2002; Salas, 2012). Consider Mr J as an example:
Task 3: write five things you do after you get out of bed. (1) Well . . . I
get up and brush my teeth; (2) I get up and go wash my teeth; (3) I get
up and feed the dog; (4) I get up and take a shower; (5) I get up . . . and
you will have to help me. Task 4: write five things you do before you
go to bed. (1) Well I get up and I don’t know what to do; (2) I get up
and don’t know what I would do; (3) I get up and don’t know what to
do; (4) I have never fallen in despair; (5) I have never . . .
Addressing presentness in psychotherapy: using external reality
It has been described that presentness implies a contraction in the 
temporal dimension of the self. Such transformation may challenge the
initiation of a therapeutic cycle, which is usually characterised by
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patients proactively bringing into a session complaints related to prob-
lematic life situations. This difficulty has been noted by different authors
(Klonoff, 2010; Prigatano, 1986), who have stressed the need to increase
the frequency of sessions (to repeat and rehearse information) or include
external aids (such as notebooks or lists of potential discussion topics) in
order to manage abstraction and memory problems. From Orlinsky’s
model of generic psychotherapy (2009), presentness would compromise
the generation of temporal patterns, which are the articulation, over the
course of treatment, of the different dimensions of the psychotherapeutic
process (explanations of the problems offered by the therapist, insights,
emotional relief, etc.).
Perhaps the most important idea to have in mind, when addressing
presentness, is that external reality is the most powerful elicitor of emo-
tional reactions. This is a fact that can be easily observed, for example,
during the transition from inpatient to outpatient rehabilitation, where
contact with the real world violently strikes patients’ perceptions of their
abilities. Before this encounter, and due to difficulties triggering emo-
tional states based on possible future scenarios, concrete patients are
unable to emotionally size up this impact. In other words, it appears that,
for concrete patients, problems only exist when they are occurring, not
much before, and not much after.
The implications of this particular state of mind for psychotherapy are
manifold. For example, psychotherapy should carefully seek to identify
real life events that generate discrepancies between patient’s abilities,
expectations, and the environment, and use them as breaches to access
subjective experience. This might seem obvious and simple, but is not.
The case of Mr A is an example of how a real life event (arrival of a new
colleague) generated a crisis that is not detected by the therapist or
reported by the patient. In this case is thanks to the close collaboration of
Mr A’s wife that this event is spotted, and then addressed with the
patient. The use of these breaches, generated by real life events, requires
the flexible management of session frequency, in order to “strike while
the iron is hot”. A close coordination with relatives and key colleagues at
work is vital to catch these events.
A second implication of dealing with presentness is how to artificially
generate breaches that allow access to subjective life. In other words,
how it may be possible to mimic real life situations in the therapeutic set-
ting, as a means to activate (and then address) conflicts. Two possibilities
must be considered here. One is the use of couple or family sessions,
alternated with individual sessions. Of special interest here are
approaches developed to address “intimacy” problems after brain injury
(Bowen, Yeates, & Palmer, 2010) and dementia (Balfour, 2011). By
including significant others in the sessions, it is possible to engage the
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patient in real life interactions, that will arouse emotional reactions more
effectively and bring interpersonal conflicts into the session. Another
useful method to generate breaches is to move out of the consulting
room into the patient’s own environment. This approach allows the ther-
apist to experience, with the patient, real life situations (at home, at
work) which can be later used as source of therapeutic material. The
work of Mark Ylvisaker and Timothy Feeney on identity reconstruction is
perhaps the best example of doing psychotherapeutic interventions in
ecological contexts (Salas, 2009; Ylvisaker & Feeney, 2000).
Making sense: building mental schemes and manipulating
negative arousal
Making sense out of the experience of acquiring a brain injury, and the
changes it implies, has been described as one of the main goals of psy-
chotherapy after brain damage (Prigatano, 1986; 1994). However,
deficits in abstraction can compromise patients’ capacity to reflect upon
emotional experience and generate meaningful interpretations of what
they are going through. Several technical modifications can be imple-
mented to bypass or compensate such abstraction impairment.
One suggestion is that insight regarding emotional or interpersonal dif-
ficulties can be best accomplished through continued repetition and gen-
eralisation (Prigatano, 1986). In other words, compared to patients
without neurological lesions, concrete patients require a prolonged
exposure to information in order to fully incorporate it as part of a men-
tal schema or mental category (which can be later used to guide behav-
iour and decision making). In some cases information may take months,
or even years, to sink in—and when it does, is often in the context of an
external event that has generated some type of internal disorganisation.
Somehow, this information appears to have been “rehearsed” inside ses-
sions, and is then meaningfully (emotionally) connected with the event,
and a new mental schema is formed. The subjective experience that
accompanies such situations can be a mixture of surprise and fulfilment.
Professor F, a patient of one of the authors (CS) arrived in a state of puz-
zlement to one session, four years after the stroke:
So this is what you meant . . . this is the problem that we keep talking
about . . . how my head doesn’t work sometimes . . . when it gets
messy, disorganised . . . when I’m too nervous. Well, I was at work
and received this call asking to finish this document . . . and I did not
expect that. My head went blank and I did not know what to do, where
to start . . . I was frozen. And there I remembered . . . and I thought 
. . . this is what we have talked about . . . the executive thing. In a
weird way that calmed me down a little bit.
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Once a mental schema has been internalised, it needs, ideally, to be gen-
eralised to other similar situations, and progressively brought under the
same explanatory category. In the case of Professor F, many other life 
situations (e.g., booking a flight, sorting out bills) that were experienced
as mind-disorganising, were explained under the same basic model:
“Dealing with unexpected events makes you feel confused, and when you
feel confused your head feels messy and it doesn’t obey you”. This basic
model was progressively enriched through personal metaphors that he
spontaneously used to explain his experience. For example, in moments
of confusion, when he felt paralysed, he would describe his mind as being
in a state of inertia, without any thinking activity.
Generalisation also implies that insights need to be shared by signifi-
cant others who may be present when the patient experiences these
events, or are actively sought after for help. It is extremely important that
significant others clearly understand the schema, so they can help the
patient without diminishing his sense of agency. For example, Professor F
spontaneously started calling his wife during moments of confusion, as a
means to extract himself from the mental inertia. He did not need help
deciding what was best to do, but could not initiate the process of think-
ing by himself. That was all he needed.
An additional problem to the generation of mental schemas is concrete
patients’ difficulty in tolerating psychological conflict—where a somatic
response generates an impulse to act which is somehow counter-regu-
lated by higher order processing (See Salas & Turnbull (2010) for a dis-
cussion on conflict, defence mechanisms, and brain injury.). By thinking
about somatic experience we detach ourselves from a perception–action
mode of functioning (doing), by adopting a reflective stance (thinking).
Because abstraction is compromised in concrete patients, somatic
responses can be experienced without a coherent representational corre-
late, only as a tendency to act (see section on concreteness, representa-
tional meaning and abstraction to avoidance behaviour in TBI). In Mr A’s
case, for example, a negative event from the environment triggered a
basic experience of “threat” which was quickly regulated by concretely
avoiding the source of discomfort (work).
The basic question that needs to be answered then is how psycho-
therapy can be shaped to address difficulties in the generation of rep-
resentational meaning from somatic experience. Several considerations
can be of use here. The first is that such patients’ representational capac-
ity (abstraction) might fluctuate according to situational demands, and
perceived availability of support. This is not a new idea. In fact, Bowen,
Yeates, and Palmer (2010) systematised a significant amount of evidence
suggesting that performance in cognitive functions of different sort is heav-
ily dependent on context. In addition, there is substantial literature on the
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impact of negative emotion (or arousal) on executive abilities (Davis &
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Demanet, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2011;
Gasper, 2003; Oei et al., 2011; Schoofs, Preuss, & Wolf, 2008; Small-
wood, Fitzgerald, Miles, & Phillips, 2009) or the capacity to think about
mental states (Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2004). A key point is that,
as psychotherapists, it is possible to influence patients’ representational
abilities by manipulating their level of negative arousal. This is of special
relevance when working with couples/families, or when the patient–
therapist relationship is the focus of the conflict (e.g., alliance rupture).
Another source of negative arousal, that requires modulation, is the
patient’s struggle to use his/her mind during sessions. Often, concrete
patients can experience difficulties generating ideas, finding words, or
understanding therapists’ interventions. The experience of these deficits
can generate vicious cycles where negative emotion impairs cognitive
function further. The therapist’s stance toward these difficulties is crucial.
He has to be available enough to act as an auxiliary ego when, for exam-
ple, the patient is unable to find a word. Nevertheless, at the same time
he has to offer the patient enough space to use, and reclaim, his own
mind, tolerating the tendency to “fill in the gaps” that is caused by
mutual frustration. A patient of one of the authors, Professor F, com-
mented on this therapeutic attitude when writing about his brain injury:
The weekly work with my psychotherapist has been very important:
supporting without replacing, confirming without imposing, helping to
understand without rushing into conclusions, week by week I’m learn-
ing a new way of relating.
A first step in the generation of meaning, or the building of mental
schemas, is helping patients to learn that somatic responses refer to
something important, disregard the exact meaning they may have. We
have denominated this process as “flagging”, because it is not about
understanding what is going on, but simply about marking the somatic
response to events as something relevant, so it can be brought in for later
discussion. In the case of Mr A. he started paying more attention to
headaches, and flagging whenever they occurred. At first he was not able
to understand their meaning by himself, but collaborative exploration
allowed the generation of a set of “typical causes” that he could later test
as possible explanations.
Making sense: using symbols to generate and compact 
meaning
We have described above how concrete patients struggle abstracting 
the essential from different elements (see Table 3). A similar problem may
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occur during the process of synthesising insights and awareness of
changes after the injury. Although it may seem paradoxical, considering
the research on metaphor comprehension impairment and TBI (e.g.,
Towne & Entwisle, 1993), several authors have suggested that the use of
metaphor or symbols can help bypass these abstraction problems
(Prigatano, 1986, 1989, 1999b; Salas, 2009; Ylvisaker & Feeney, 2000;
Ylvisaker, Mcpherson, Kayes, & Pellet, 2008). A possible explanation for
this apparent contradiction is that metaphors used in experimental set-
tings, compared to those used in psychotherapeutic interventions, are not
chosen by patients themselves, and therefore, they are not personally
compelling or emotionally meaningful (see Teasdale & Barnard, 1993 for
an approach to metaphor based on affect and action tendencies). In addi-
tion, experimental designs actively avoid the overexposure of participants
to stimuli, while in psychotherapeutic settings with concrete patients rep-
etition is a key element in the generation of new mental schemas.
Although different authors emphasise diverse aspects of metaphor in
their use with concrete patients, they tend to agree that metaphor facili-
tates the understanding of complex ideas (Prigatano, 1986; Ylvisaker,
Mcpherson, Kayes, & Pellet, 2008), integrates cognition and affect
(Prigatano, 1989), helps articulating identity issues (Prigatano, 1999b;
Ylvisaker & Feeney, 2000) and can be presented as tangible graphic
material (e.g., drawings or identity maps).
For Prigatano (1986), symbols address the core issue with few words
and powerful imagery, helping patients with information processing
deficits to grasp abstract ideas. He suggests that, paradoxically,
metaphors and symbols are often necessary to help patients understand
common experiences after acquiring a brain injury, such as the loss of
normality (Prigatano, 1989). Even more importantly, symbols (e.g., the
journey of the hero; birth/death) offer guidance in coping with such
transformations (Prigatano, 1989), facilitating the process of rebuilding a
meaningful life (Pepping & Prigatano, 2003). Thus for him the use of
symbols related to basic human activities, such as work, love, and play,
can help patients to integrate thoughts and feelings, re-establishing a new
sense of self (Prigatano, 1989).
Mark Ylvisaker and Timothy Feeney approach the use of metaphors
from a slightly different point of view. Metaphors are, for these authors,
effective instruments compacting information and generating positive
versions of the self that can be used to create meaning, motivate and 
regulate behaviour (Ylvisaker & Feeney, 2000; Ylvisaker, McPherson,
Kayes, & Pellet, 2008). Through the use of metaphor, for example by
choosing a personal heroic figure (e.g., a sportsman), different values
(e.g., strength of character), goals (e.g., be respected), feelings (e.g., being
in control), and action strategies (e.g., careful preparation), can be 
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emotionally unified into an identity schema, making it more accessible
to memory with only one unit of thought (Ylvisaker & Feeney, 2000).
Usually the construction of these schemas is supported by external
graphic organisers, that allow concrete patients to elaborate, organise,
remember, and express thoughts more effectively.
Becoming concrete: concrete patients need concrete therapists
When it comes to addressing the therapeutic challenges posed by con-
creteness, the modifications suggested in the section above can be
assumed to be useful. For example, the generation of affective/mental
scripts of the patient–therapist relationship can be facilitated by the use of
metaphors and graphic organisers, as well as the basic principles of rep-
etition and generalisation. We will not develop this point further in order
to focus on another often unattended problem, which is how to access
these patients’ inner experience from an abstract mind point of view.
We believe that a first step in this task is to familiarise with a non-con-
ceptual form of experience. Mark Ylvisaker, for example, described this
as “talking from the guts” (Salas, 2009), suggesting that concreteness is
related to a rather visceral level of processing information, also called
implicational meaning (Teasdale, 1997, in Ylvisaker & Feeney, 2000). In
practical terms this would require therapists to push themselves into a
bottom-up therapeutic stance, where staying in the present moment, and
attending to somatic and affective responses are the main points of refer-
ence. This approach is not new. In fact, coming from a psychoanalytic
background, Wilfred Bion (1963; 1967) suggested that the basic clinical
attitude was to confront every session “without memory, desire, or
understanding”; because they might cloud the therapist’s capacity to
grasp what is happening during a session. Interestingly, a similar idea has
been put forward by Mindfulness based therapies, which attempt to
develop the capacity for “sustained moment-to-moment awareness”
(Siegel, Germer, & Olendzki, 2009).
Becoming concrete does not imply that the therapist should remain
concrete, or completely abandon an abstract stance. As we have sug-
gested before, that is impossible, for we are constantly distancing our-
selves from experience in order to make sense of it. Becoming familiar
with the world of the concrete is simply an initial step that offers first
hand material with which to comprehend the patient’s suffering, and the
experience that close ones might also have of his/her new way of relating
to them. An ideal therapist should be able to immerse himself in a con-
crete mode of functioning, so he can later emerge from it to reflect upon
such experience. This constant shifting between the two modes of func-
tioning is perhaps the heart of the therapeutic process.
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We would like to offer a final observation on the emotional impact of
treating concrete patients. Therapists often arrive at working with brain
injured patients after being trained to work with normal or psychiatric
populations. One of the consequences of such “career path” is that ther-
apist frequently spend quite a long time adjusting their theoretical and
technical tools. This period of fine-tuning often involves a grieving
process too, where the therapist mourns for the patient he will not have,
the one he was trained for, the one who will get cured by gaining insight
about his problems and history, the abstract patient. In a way, part of the
therapist’s identity is endangered during such transition: what am I? Am I
just a neuropsychologist? Am I just a counsellor? What can I do if my
tools do not work? To address these emotional difficulties is perhaps one
of the most important tasks when working with concrete patients.
Closing remarks
Concreteness is a frequently observed phenomenon in rehabilitation set-
tings, causing important obstacles to teams in helping patients to resume
a productive and meaningful life. Concrete patients, as any other human
beings, experience emotional difficulties adapting to the drastic changes
that a brain injury inevitably results. Overcoming these difficulties is
especially demanding for these patients, because their “thinking” ability,
a core capacity for psychotherapy, is compromised. In this paper we
have tried to described in detail how concreteness transform different
dimensions of the Self and how these changes may challenge the use of
psychotherapeutic tools. We have also described technical modifications
to address these changes (see Table 4 for a summary).
The observation of concrete patients in therapeutic settings is also
important for theoretical motives. It sheds light on several neuro-philo-
sophical problems, such as the neural basis of reason and emotion, time
and consciousness, and the construction of meaning. After considering
the evidence that these “experiments of nature” present, when the veil of
abstraction (and its illusions) is removed, our idea of what is fundamen-
tally human seem to change. We are organisms closely connected to our
environment, and our behaviour, is the consequence of this incessant
flux. Consciousness echoes this flux, always unfolding in an ever chang-
ing now. And emotion, visceral emotion, is the core that generates mean-
ing, a felt meaning. This is the “world of the simple” described by Oliver
Sacks, or the “shrunken environment” portrayed by Kurt Goldstein.
Several authors have addressed these same questions from other points
of view. We hope this article will contribute by motivating psychothera-
pists and researchers to further explore and understand the world of the
concrete.
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Table 4: Summary of technical modifications when working with concrete
patients
Concreteness Impact on psycho- Theoretical and technical 
features therapeutic operations modifications
and tools
Changes Initiation of a Therapeutic Use real life events as “breaches”
in the Cycle: difficulty using events to access subjective experience 
TEMPORAL from the past and possible of conflict
dimension future scenarios, as session 
of the Self material Close coordination with 
relatives and work colleagues to 
spot events of emotional 
significance
Flexible management of 
frequency of sessions to capture 
events of emotional significance
Alternate individual sessions with 
couple and family sessions to 
mimic real life situations
Incorporate field trips to explore, 
with the patient, real life 
situations
Therapeutic Bond, Enhancing patient’s sense of 
Task team-work: difficulty agency by calibrating when and 
coordinating positions of how much help is needed
control and initiative
Changes Positive In-session impact, Teaching patient to “flag” 
in the Insight: difficulty generating somatic responses to events
REFLECTIVE awareness of motivations 
dimension and making sense of Collaborative generation of a 
of the Self emotional responses set of “typical” causes, or 
events, that trigger somatic 
responses
Prolonged exposure to 
information or repetition
Generalisation of insight to other 
situations and use of significant 
others to reinforce new mental 
schemas
continued on next page
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Table 4: Summary of technical modifications when working with concrete
patients (continued)
Concreteness Impact on psycho- Theoretical and technical 
features therapeutic operations modifications
and tools
Changes Use of personally compelling 
in the metaphors
REFLECTIVE
dimension Use of external graphic 
of the Self organisers (e.g., identity maps)
Negative In-session impact: Monitoring and manipulating 
difficulty tolerating negative patient’s level of negative 
arousal when exploring arousal
psychological conflict
Facilitate cognitive processing 
without compromising patient’s 
sense of agency
Therapeutic Bond, Personal Use of graphic organisers, 
Rapport: difficulty generating metaphors, and repetition/
emotionally-driven cognitions generalisation principles
about the patient-therapist 
relationship
Therapeutic Bond, Personal Adopting a Bottom-up 
Rapport: difficulty attuning therapeutic stance: staying in the 
to a concrete mode of present moment and attending 
experience to somatic and affective 
responses
Flexible shifting between concrete
and abstract modes of 
functioning
Elaborate mourning feelings 
associated to working with 
non-abstract patients
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Notes
1. Deficits in the use of abstraction capacities to generate representational
meaning can also be caused by excessive amounts of arousal or negative
emotion, which dampens higher order cognition. This has been described,
for example, by Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, and Target (2004) in relation to how
anxiety compromises the capacity to think about our own and other peo-
ple’s mental states.
2. Here the distinction between bottom-up and top-down emotion generation
described by Ochsner et al., (2009) is extremely relevant to critically read
evidence suggesting that TBI patients present a decrease in emotional reac-
tivity.
3. The term organic countertransference is used to emphasise that some of the
feelings and sensations experienced by the therapists may not be related to
the patient’s conflicts or personality traits, as is often seen in psychiatric pop-
ulations, but to the peculiar way in which his “disorganised mind” works.
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